

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02  
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P R 130951Z AUG 77  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7112  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 23590

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: CH, FR, AL, YU, VR  
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS OF CHINA

REF: PARIS 19004

SUMMARY: IN PERIODIC TOUR D'HORIZON, QUAI DEPUTY  
DIRECTOR FOR ASIA LECLERCQ, GAVE THE QUAI'S CURRENT  
VIEWS OF THE PRC INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FOREIGN  
POLICY. LECLERCQ EXPRESSED FAIRLY STANDARD VIEWS ON THE  
REEMERGENCE OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING AND THE  
POSSIBLY UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM OVER WHICH HUA KOO-FENG  
NOMINALLY PRESIDES. THE OPEN ROLE OF TENG INSURES  
THAT POLICIES ASSOCIATED WITH HIM, PARTICULARLY ECO-  
NOMIC RATIONALISM, WILL BE EVEN MORE EMPHASIZED.  
FOREIGN POLICY WILL CHANGE LITTLE, BUT, AS EVERYONE  
HAS NOTED, CHINA SHOULD BE MORE OPEN TO WESTERN  
TECHNOLOGY, IF NOT CREDIT PRACTICES. THE FRENCH HAVE  
NOTED A DOWNTURN IN THE DENUNCIATIONS OF THE US,  
PARTICULARLY OVER AFRICA; THEY DO NOT KNOW WHETHER  
THIS IS MERELY TACTICAL. LECLERCQ THOUGHT THAT THE  
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TITO VISIT TO CHINA WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP SHOWING  
CONSIDERABLE IDEOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY, AN ATTRIBUTE  
OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH TENG. SIMILARLY A GOVERNMENT IN  
WHICH TENG PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE WOULD BE LESS CON-  
CERNED BY IDEOLOGICAL SNIPING FROM TIRANA. END SUMMARY.

1. CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AS USUAL, THE QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA, LECLERCQ, HAD LITTLE STARTLING TO SAY ABOUT CHINESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. AMBASSADOR ARNAUD WAS ON HOLIDAY IN FRANCE, BUT LECLERCQ IMPLIED THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE EMBASSY IN PEKING HAD SENT IN VERY MUCH ANALYSIS OF RECENT CHINESE DEVELOPMENTS. LECLERCQ THOUGHT THAT TENG HAD BEEN PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WINGS FOR SOME TIME AND HAD NEVER REALLY STOPPED BEING A POLITICAL FORCE IN CHINA. ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOME TRUTH TO THE STORIES THAT TENG HAD SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE CANTON AREA WITH GENERAL HSU SHIH-YU FOLLOWING HIS EXPULSION FROM HIS POSITIONS, THEY THOUGHT WE WOULD PROBABLY NEVER KNOW WHAT HAD REALLY HAPPENED. IN ANY CASE THEY THOUGHT THAT TENG HAD BEEN INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING POLICY IN A VERY STRONG WAY FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS. THE USE OF HIS THREE WORKS (PARTICULARLY "SOME QUESTIONS ON ACCELERATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY") WAS ONE INDICATION OF HIS IMPORTANCE ON THE INTERNAL SCENE, AND ON THE FOREIGN FRONT TENG PROBABLY PLAYED A ROLE IN SETTING UP THE US AND YUGOSLAV VISITS. THE FRENCH HAD NOTED THE SUPPORT WHICH TENG OBVIOUSLY HAD FROM SOME MILITARY AND REGIONAL LEADERS, BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT HUA HAD HIS SUPPORTERS ALSO. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ACCOMPANYING TENG'S REHABILITATION, HUA WAS CONFIRMED AS PARTY LEADER AND SPECIFICALLY AS THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR TENG'S SECOND REEMERGENCE.

2. LECLERCQ THOUGHT THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS REMAINING WAS WHETHER HUA WOULD RETAIN THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP. ON BALANCE THE FRENCH HAD CONCLUDED THAT HUA CONSIDERED THAT THE GOVERNMENT POSITION ENHANCED HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A STRONG POWER POSITION, AND IT WOULD BE VIEWED AS A REDUCTION IN HIS PRESTIGE IF TENG ASSUMED THE FUNCTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HUA LIMITED HIMSELF TO PARTY AND MILITARY MATTERS AND IN TURN TENG LIMITED HIMSELF MORE TO PURELY GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION, HUA'S IMPORTANCE AS PARTY CHAIRMAN COULD SIGNAL HIS PRIME IMPORTANCE IF

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P R 130951Z AUG 77  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7113  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
USLO PEKING

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THE PARTY (IN WHICH TENG RANKS NUMBER THREE) MAKES ALL MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS. THE FRENCH WERE THEREFORE KEEPING AN OPEN MIND ABOUT WHETHER TENG WOULD BECOME PRIME MINISTER AND IF HE DID SO WHAT IT WOULD MEAN ABOUT HUA'S FUTURE. THEY WERE INCLINED TO THINK THAT PART OF THE BARGAIN WAS THAT THE "OLD COMRADES IN ARMS" OF MAO WOULD CONTINUE WITH A SORT OF "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP" WITH TENG THE PRINCIPAL EXPONENT FOR GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT AND PRESENTATION OF POLICY OPTIONS TO THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND HUA WOULD BE MAINTAINED AS THE NOMINAL HEAD OF THE PARTY AND HENCE HEAR TO THE LEGACY OF THE LAST OF THE REMAINING PALADINS.

### 3. FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE FRENCH HAVE SEEN FEW CHANGES IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. THE ANTI-SOVIET THEME REMAINED AS STRONG AS BEFORE. THE GRADUAL INCREASE IN OPENNESS TO THE WEST WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE, RAPIDLY IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY, BUT MORE SLOWLY IN THE AREA OF LONGER-TERM  
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CREDIT TIES WITH THE WEST. THE RECENT BANKING MISSION INDICATED SOME RELAXATION IN THE CREDIT POLICIES BUT THE CHINESE STILL SHOW RELUCTANCE TO BE UNDER A LONG TERM OBLIGATION WHICH MIGHT LIMIT THEIR POLITICAL FREEDOM OF ACTION.

4. RELATIONS WITH THE US

SINCE OUR LAST CONVERSATION IN JUNE (REFTEL), THE FRENCH HAD NOTED A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE EXPRESSIONS OF DISCONTENT WITH THE US AND ITS POLICIES. CHINESE OFFICIALS HAD PREVIOUSLY COMPLAINED THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS LACKING IN UNDERSTANDING OF THE DANGERS OF THE USSR, INEFFECTIVE, UNRESPONSIVE, ETC. US "INACTION" IN AFRICA WAS FREQUENTLY CITED AS THE PROOF OF THIS PRC JUDGMENT. IN MORE RECENT CONTACTS THE US WAS EITHER NOT PARTICULARLY DISCUSSED OR, IF MENTIONED, THE CONDEMNATION WAS NOT SO SHARP. LECLERCQ SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN A REAPPRAISAL OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION OR WHETHER IT WAS PURELY A TACTICAL MOVE IN LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING VISIT BY THE SECRETARY. IN ANY CASE, THE CHINESE CONTINUED TO BE OBSESSED WITH SOVIET ADVANCES IN AFRICA AND WERE CLEARLY BASING MANY OF THEIR JUDGMENTS OF THE US ON OUR PERFORMANCE IN THAT CONTINENT. LECLERCQ SPECULATED THAT CHINESE LEADERS HAD EXPECTED TO ENLIST A GREAT FOLLOWING IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES AND HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT SO MANY OF THEM HAD TURNED TO "SOCIAL IMPERIALISM" INSTEAD. THE CHINESE HOPE THAT THE US AND OTHERS CAN EXCLUDE THE USSR UNTIL A TIME WHEN THE RECTITUDE OF THE CHINESE MODEL FOR THE THIRD WORLD BECOMES EVIDENT.

5. SECRETARY'S TRIP

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LECLERCQ SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING ABOUT THE RESULTS OF SECRETARY VANCE'S TRIP TO CHINA SINCE IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY PROVIDE ONE OF THE CLEAREST INSIGHTS INTO THE NEW "TENG GOVERNMENT" AND ITS POLICIES. PRIME MINISTER BARRE WOULD BE VISITING CHINA SOME TIME BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN MARCH 1978 AND WOULD PERHAPS WISH TO DISCUSS CHINA WITH THE USG DURING HIS SEPTEMBER VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

6. TITO VISIT TO CHINA

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LECLERCQ THOUGHT THAT THE DECISION TO INVITE TITO WAS NOT UNDERTAKEN LIGHTLY. PRC LEADERS NO DOUBT KNEW THAT SUCH AN INVITATION WOULD IRRITATE NOT ONLY ALBANIA BUT ALSO ALL THOSE FOR WHOM TITO IS REVISIONISM INCARNATE. THE VISIT WILL OFFICIALLY BE GOVERNMENTAL, BUT THE PARTY, IDEOLOGICAL ISSUE WILL BE POSED SINCE SOME PREVIOUS YUGOSLAV EMISSARIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THEIR PARTY TITLES, AND TITO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ANOTHER PERSON WHO HAVE ONLY PARTY, FUNCTIONS. LECLERCQ THINKS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PARTY RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA IS DOUBTFUL, BUT TITO'S LACK OF IDEOLOGICAL RESPECT-ABILITY WILL IN ANY CASE BE DOWNPLAYED.

7. SINO/ALBANIAN RELATIONS

LECLERCQ SAID THAT THE ALBANIANS HAVE LONG BEEN UNHAPPY WITH PEKING'S DEPARTURES FROM PURITY -- PARTICULARLY SINCE 1972. HOWEVER, MORE POLITICAL MATTERS SUCH AS  
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THE CHANGING PRC VIEW OF YUGOSLAVIA AND EUROCOMMUNISM PERHAPS TOUCHED ALBANIA'S INTERESTS MORE DIRECTLY. THE TITO VISIT WAS PROBABLY THE LAST STRAW FOR THE ALBANIANS. LECLERCQ THOUGHT THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT ACCORD TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE ALBANIAN ATTACKS -- IT WAS IN LINE WITH TENG'S TOUGH REALISM TO CONSIDER THAT THE FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA ON

THE EVE OF TITO'S POSSIBLE DEMISE WAS MORE IMPORTANT  
THAN TIRANA'S FLIGHTS OF IDEOLOGICAL ABUSE.  
HARTMAN

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